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Fundamentals of Islamic conception of Caliphate
The Islamic Sunni concept of power (the state) was basically formed in the 11-14th centuries.
Sharia does not know enough number of the norms of the Quran and the Sunnah of Muhammad which regulate the vertical relations of power. These sources do not contain concrete precepts settling the organization and activity of the Islamic state or determining its content and essence.
Moreover, the Arabic term dawlah which in the modern sense is translated as "state" is rarely used there. The Quran mentions it just once (59:7) in the meaning of "property", "fortune", "domain". Instead, the hadiths contain such notions as imamate (which initially denoted leading the course of prayer in the mosque) and Caliphate ("succession"), which are both used in traditional Sunni thought to denote the Islamic state.
The restriction of certain precepts of the Quran and Sunnah in terms of the structure and activity of power made the role of the fiqh doctrine crucial in forming the concept of this phenomenon. In this respect Islamic science faced a complicated task: a coherent concept of Islamic governance and a system of concrete legal norms regulating the structure of the power and activity of its institutions were to be elaborated on the basis of just a few quite abstract Sharia precepts.
Islamic thought emphasizes that, not by coincidence did the Prophet leave behind only the basic idea of the Caliphate which does not significantly restrict Muslims, allowing them to flexibly select different forms of government in different historical circumstances. Thus, the major task of fiqh is to settle the general principles of state building and the activity of that state using insight from Sharia and only then recommending options for organising an Islamic state to meet the conditions of Muslim community. Hundreds of years after Prophet Muhammad, by the virtue of the broad interpretation of the few provisions of the Quran and Sunnah in terms of the Caliphate and by comparison of the Prophet's actions and "the righteous" caliphs of the highestlevel leaders of the community, the faqihs (scholars entitled to elaborate fiqh) codified the initial principles for the organization and functioning of state power.
The key category of classical Sunni political theory is the Caliphate which is viewed in two interrelated ways: the essence of Islamic state power, and a specific form of government.
The fundamental understanding of the Caliphate still comes from the approach introduced by the prominent Islamic scholar and jurist al-Mawardi (974-1058) who in his outstanding work "Norms of Power and Religious Authorities" provided the following definition: "the essence of imamate is the succession of the oracular mission in support of the faith and control of mundane affairs" [See (al-Mawardi. 1973:5) ]. This treatise introduces the terms "Caliphate" and "imamate" as synonyms though thereafter Sunni legal thought adopted the term "Caliphate" as the normative model of the Islamic state.
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When analysing this definition, it is not difficult to notice that in al-Mawardi's understanding the Caliphate introduces the function of the supreme mundane (political) power and support of the faith for the Muslim community. In other words, the major feature of the Caliphate is the role of the power and its orientation to solve certain tasks of religious and political nature but the form and structure of the state are not rigorously defined.
Islamic politics deals a lot with the derivation of the Caliphate. According to Sunni thinkers, following al-Mawardi's views, the establishment of the Caliphate is essential and represents a duty imposed both on the leader of the Islamic state and all Muslim people.
Religious doctrines and pure logical arguments support the duty to the Caliphate. One of the most important reasons is the control on the part of the Caliphate of the performance of all the religious duties and Sharia norms on the whole by Muslims. Among the rational arguments in favour of the Caliphate is the necessity to avoid chaos and anarchy in state and public affairs [See (al-Mawardi. 1973:5) ]. Insisting on the idea that even an unjust and wrongful power is preferable to anarchy, Islamic jurists do not miss the chance to quote the Prophet's words: "A despotic imam is better than turmoil".
A peculiar kind of solution to the issue of who the supreme power in the Caliphate belongs to is introduced in Sunni political science. The most popular modern concept is that the supreme holder of sovereignty in the Caliphate is Allah and the Islamic state is totally built on the basis of the delegation imposed by Him on the community. Power on earth is considered to be exercised by the community on behalf of Allah and that community holds sovereignty which is nothing but "the reflection" of the supreme sovereignty of Allah. Developing this approach some contemporary thinkers emphasize that sovereignty in the Islamic state is essentially shared between Sharia representing the will of Allah and the community whose will is not absolute and is restricted by Sharia [See (Muhammad 'Ammara)].
The sovereign rights of the community materialize, first and foremost, in their authority to choose the caliph (governor, ruler) who is to manage affairs on behalf of the community. In the meantime, the community do not concede their exclusive rights to the caliph-they only delegate and entrust him with power. Both in the execution of this authority and in policymaking the sovereignty of the community is only related to the will of Allah expressed in Sharia.
For instance, the community is entitled to legislate only in matters which are not settled by the Quran and Sunnah and the community's subordination to the caliph's power is stipulated by his compliance with Sharia precepts.
In respect of the organisational frameworks of Islamic state power, the parameters of the Sunni political theory does not have a strictly defined procedure for the succession of Islamic state leadership. However, according to the most widespread concept, the caliph does not derive supreme secular and religious power and is not appointed by his predecessor but gets appointed in pursuance of the special agreement-Bay'ah-concluded between the community and the candidate. This form is thought to best fit the spirit of Islam. Here the community is represented in the agreement by a group of outstanding Muslim scholars -mujtahids-endowed with justice, wisdom and the ability to independently solve matters not settled by the Quran or
Sunnah.
The caliph is personally responsible for exercising power in the community and is entitled to take any measures to serve the interests of the community providing that he follows
Sharia. As long as the caliph's policy lies within this framework, he is empowered to demand absolute obedience and subordination from Muslims. That is why the Caliphate agreement is unlimited and valid as long as the caliph strictly follows the Sharia norms. If it is proved without any doubt that the caliph breaches the terms of the agreement, he is to be ousted from power and the Muslim community is no longer obliged to obey him. Here, theoretically the community is entitled to demand from the caliph to perform his duties possessing the right to control his actions. However, common Muslims cannot interfere with state affairs or evaluate the caliph's policy-mujtahids are in charge of this. Islamic thought proceeds from the fact that they represent the community in relations with the caliph and protect the community's interests. If
Sharia was considered to be "the law" for the elite, the opinion of mujtahids is "the law" for common Muslims.
The unique merit of the Caliphate form of rule is the obligation of the head of the state to follow Sharia norms in all his actions, and act with "the interests and common use" of his subjects and to consult when taking important decisions. Theoretically the caliph is entitled to consult any of his subjects. However, in practice the opinion of common Muslims is not taken into account as they do not possess sufficient knowledge to give advice to the ruler. It is deemed that the matters of state policy are not to be solved by the whole community since this is the prerogative of the caliph and the advisory board including mujtahids. This body, whose opinion is equated with the opinion of the community, is supposed to control the caliph's activity preventing despotism and tyranny. Until the middle of the 13th century the direct successor to the righteous caliphs was the Caliphate of the Umayyad and the Abbasid Caliphate which retained at least some external characteristics of the ideal Islamic state. Nevertheless, over time the mechanism of power in the Islamic world deviated more and more from the classical concept of the Caliphate, though formally the Caliphate still existed. In the middle Ages the mission to represent it was obtained by the Ottoman Empire. Arab rulers in a losing rivalry with the Empire had to renounce claims over the Caliphate and, as a result, the Ottoman sultan acquired the title of the caliph. In the 16th century most Arab countries became part of the Empire and acknowledged the sultan's power.
As an institution, on religious grounds and formally uniting all Muslims, the Caliphate The Department of Fatwas emphasizes that the aim of the Imamate (Islamic state power) is actually the execution of everything that includes the duties and responsibilities of the head of a modern state. Moreover, those functions are very similar to the authorities of the rulers of the numerous previous emirates, sultanates and even some caliphates separated from the initial Caliphate.
As a matter of principle, according to Sharia it is better when the rulers of different regions act under the supreme authority of one head-the caliph. But if the Caliphate in this sense is impossible, it does not deny the necessity and legitimacy of rulers of different existing states. The heads of the modern Islamic states do act as such leaders. To deny this will lead to a situation when people will lose their leader and chaos will reign in the state, which brings the country to total decay. This would contradict the purposes of the Law-Giver (i.e. Allah). In that case damage, corruption and harm will prevail over the goals and values which Islam aims to protect from encroachment and which include the support and preservation of the religion, life, sense, honour, dignity and property.
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